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Abstract 
This chapter examines the role of commonly espoused environmental principles in US 
and Canadian law. A number of substantive principles are evident in the environmental 
laws of both countries, including: cost-benefit analysis, transboundary responsibility, 
sustainable use, sustainable development, pollution prevention, precaution, integration, 
polluter pays, strict liability, and extended producer responsibility. However, they often 
play a secondary role to political and economic considerations in shaping environmental 
policy. Thus, the positive functions that substantive principles are sometimes thought to 
perform - increasing coherence, legitimacy, transboundary consistency, and potentially 
the progressive realization of environmental protection - appear relatively muted in 
the US and Canadian legal systems. More 'procedural' principles, such as federalism, 
public participation, public information, availability of remedies, judicial review, and 
private enforcement, however, are well rooted and broadly important in both systems. 
Substantive principles may play a more significant role in local government and non­
state environmental governance institutions. 
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VI.29.1 Introduction 
This chapter comes at a portentous time in US and Canadian environmental law. While 
the two countries share legal traditions and many environmental problems, recent 
national elections seem to have sent them in opposite directions regarding environmental 
law. These contrasting directions underscore our conclusion that, while environmental 
principles are evident and sometimes important in both countries' environmental 
laws, political pragmatism is often a more powerful force, particularly in the United 
States. Canada has formally enshrined sustainable development as its ultimate goal 
and has adopted the precautionary principle as the overriding standard governing its 
environmental protection and regulatory activities. But again, the record is replete 
with the consequences of political pragmatism over principle. Therefore, the positive 
contributions that environmental principles are sometimes thought to facilitate, such as 
increasing the intelligibility, predictability, legitimacy, transboundary consistency, and 
the long-term progress of environmental law, 1 are relatively constrained in the US and 
Canadian.legal systems. 
VI.29.2 Politics and money in environmental law 
In describing the early American Republic, de Tocqueville wrote: 'As one digs deeper 
into the national character of the Americans, one sees that they have sought th� value 
of everything in this world only in the answer to this single question: how much money 
will it bring in?'2 This observation still applies well to US environmental law. Money 
and political power have often been the driving force, with governing principles running 
a distant second. The first US federal law on liability for marine pollution, the 1851 
Limitation of Liability Act,3 was enacted not to protect the waterways, but to protect 
1 For contrasting perspectives, see de Sadeleer (2002) and Scotford (2017). 
2 De Tocqueville (1831). 
3 Act of March 3, 1851, ch. 43, § 3, 9 Stat. 635 (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 30501 et seq. 
(formerly 46 U.S.C. § 183). 
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the nascent US shipping industry by limiting the liability of vessel owners for clean-up 
costs of marine accidents to the post-casualty value of the vessel. Over a hundred years 
later, the true consequences of the limitation emerged when the liability of the owners of 
Torrey Canyon oil tanker, which spilled over 100,000 tons of crude oil into the English 
Channel, fouling 100 miles of British and French coasts, was limited to the $50 value of 
the one salvaged lifeboat.4 As a result of the Torrey Canyon disaster and the 1969 Santa 
Barbara oil-well blowout, federal laws were adopted5 aimed at holding accountable 
those responsible for oil spill pollution, demonstrating the modern American tendency 
of legislation following public outcry over major environmental misadventures. Many 
other US environmental statutes are also the direct results of the public outcry over 
major pollution events. Examples include: the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),6 enacted after the forced evacuation 
of a community neighboring a hazardous waste site;7 the Toxic Substances Control 
Act (TSCA),8 enacted after a series of high-profile cases of public contamination;9 the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA), enacted in 
reaction to the Bhopal tragedy;10 and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, enacted in response 
to the Exxon Valdez oil spill.11 
Even when the US Congress promotes environmental goals, it can act to favor power­
ful business interests. A major bipartisan bill promoting energy efficiency and research, 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 12 famously exempted hydraulic fracturing from the Safe 
Drinking Water Act (SDWA), reportedly at the behest of the Vice President acting on 
behalf of his former employer.13 As discussed further below, there is a constant tendency 
in both US and Canadian environmental politics to treat environmental regulation as a 
threat to economic prosperity and growth.14 While the idea that environmental quality 
is necessary to prosperity is also present, it remains remarkably weak, indicating that 
sustainability analysis has yet to take deep root in the political culture of either country. 
As this chapter goes to press the problem is worsening in the US, with the Trump admin­
istration pursuing a great many initiatives to weaken or eliminate existing environmental 
protections. 
4 Morgan (2011). 
5 Ibid. Two international treaties were also promulgated (International Convention on 
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, November 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 9 
I.L.M. 45 (1970); International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, December 18, 1971, 111.L.M. 284 (1972), but in another 
example of American'.s quixotic relationship with environmental regulation, neither was ratified 
by the US. 
6 P.L. 96-510, 42 U.S.C. and (33) § 9601(14) and (33), December 11, 1980. 
7 Nowak (1990). 
8 P.L. 94-469, Stat. 90 Stat. 2003. 
9 On the legislative history ofTSCA, see Markell (2010). On these events generally, see Nader, 
Brownstein and Richard (1981). 
to P.L. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1728. 
11 P.L. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484. 
12 P.L. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594. 
13 Energy Policy Act of 2005, § 322. See NY Times Editorial, 'The Halliburton Loophole', 
November 2, 2009 at A28. 
14 For a review of the Canadian history, see Wood, Tanner and Richardson (2010). 
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Despite persistent political constraints, both nations have made progress in envi­
ronmental regulation over the past five decades, while also realizing significant eco­
nomic growth. Although they have typically relied on the problem-centered approach 
that results from regulating in response to crises, they have also established several 
fairly comprehensive regulatory programs. The US Clean Air Act has a forty-year 
record of significantly curbing air pollution;15 Canada has achieved similar success. 16 
The US Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)17 created a comprehensive 
framework for the proper management of hazardous and non-hazardous waste, as have 
federal and provincial laws in Canada. But despite the emphasis on alternatives to land­
filling, both the US and Canada have increased the amount of municipal waste produced 
per capita in the last two decades, with Canada ranked last out of the 17 Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development states.18 America's CERCLA has prompted 
the clean-up of hundreds of hazardous waste sites, although declining funding in recent 
years has delayed some remedial action programs. As of 2013, approximately 39 mil­
lion Americans still lived within three miles of a non-federally owned contaminated 
site serious enough to be placed on the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) 
National Priorities List. 19 Reporting requirements have significantly increased in both 
countries for all types of land, water, and air emissions, as well as for toxic substances, 
pesticides, and other chemicals.20 Water quality also appears to be improving overall,21 
although significant contamination events have occurred recently, most notably in Flint, 
Michigan.22 
VI.29.3 Governance principles 
Institutional arrangements for environmental governance in the US and Canada bear 
many similarities. Both countries have a strikingly wide range of actors who can directly 
or indirectly control environmental protection efforts. Unlike many nations, power is 
vested not just in a national regulator, nor even solely in the government itself. As 
described further below, both countries have dual sovereignty systems in which 
15 EPA, Our Nation's Air: Status and Trends Through 2015 (2016), posted September 15, 2016 
at https://gispub.epa.gov/air/trendsreport/2016/ (accessed December 2, 2016). 
16 Environment and Climate Change Canada, Air Pollutant Emission Inventory, 1990-2014 
(2016). 
17 P.L. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795. 
18 Conference Board of Canada Municipal Waste Generation 2013 http://www.conference 
board.ca/hcp/details/environment/municipal-waste-generation.aspx (accessed December 19, 2016). 
19 US GAO, Superfund: Trends in Federal Funding and Cleanup ofEPA's Nonfederal National 
Priorities List Sites (2015), at http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672734.pdf (accessed December 19, 
2016).
20 See e.g., TSCA § 8(b) (directing the EPA to establish a list of each chemical substance 
manufactured or processed, including imports, in the United States); U.S. Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) 7 U.S.C. §136 et seq. (requiring all pesticides distributed 
or sold in the United States to be registered with the EPA); Canadian Environmental Protection 
Act, 1999 (CEPA 1999), §§ 70-72 (Information Gathering). 
21 EPA 2013 National Public Water Systems Compliance Report (2014). 
22 For a synopsis of the Flint crisis see 'A Timeline of the Water Crisis in Flint, Michigan', 
ABC News, posted December 20, 2016, at http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/timeline-water­
crisis-flint-michigan-44300483 (accessed December 21, 2016). 
Environmental principles in US and Canadian law 409 
the state or province may be more important than the federal government. In addi­
tion, both countries have internal first peoples ( organized indigenous communities pre­
dating European settlement) with their own claims to sovereignty and environmental 
authority. While a tendency not to respect these powers was most recently visible in 
the US Dakota Access pipeline controversy, indigenous authorities are fairly well 
established in each country's laws. In parallel with expanded governmental regula­
tion, environmental law in both countries allocates major roles to non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and citizens in leading (or forcing) environmental protections, 
both through political pressure and citizen enforcement powers. 
VL29.3.l Federalism 
Both countries have dual systems of sovereignty, where each federal government and 
each American State (through the US Constitution) and Canadian Province (through 
the Crown and Constitution Act 1867) are sovereign entities. As a result of the dual 
systems, it is not always clear where the federal power begins and state/provincial power 
ends. 
In the US, where the federal government has authority to act, federal law is 
dominant.23 Constitutional authority for the nation's relatively expansive body of 
environmental legislation and regulation has been found mainly in Congress's power to 
regulate commerce.24 Federal authority is not total, however; it must arise from one of 
the enumerated powers granted to the federal government; residuary powers are reserved 
to the States or the people by the 10th Amendment to the Constitution. 25 
Consistent with their historical authority for environmental regulation under the 
police power, the States have a large, often primary, role in carrying out federal envi­
ronmental legislation. For example, under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), the 
EPA must grant each State primary enforcement power once the State meets statutory 
requirements,26 most importantly that the state adopts 'drinking water regulations that 
are no less stringent than the national primary drinking water regulations'.27 But the 
EPA may rescind the State's primary enforcement authority if the requirements are 
no longer met.28 While States cannot overrule federal minimum requirements, they are 
usually free to adopt stricter ones. 29 
23 U.S. Constit. Art. VI, § 2 (the 'Supremacy Clause'). 
24 U.S. Constit. Art. I,§ 8, Cl. 3. 
25 New York v U.S., 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (because the statute requiring States to take title to 
low-level nuclear waste 'offers the States a "choice" between the two unconstitutionally coercive 
alternatives - either accepting ownership of waste or regulating according to Congress's instruc­
tions - the provision lies outside Congress's enumerated powers and is inconsistent with the Tenth 
Amendment'). 
26 42 u.s.c.§ 300g-2. 
27 42 U.S.C. § 300g-2(a)( l ). 
28 42 U.S.C. § 300g-2(b). The Supreme Court has specifically upheld this one-sided version 
of a State/federal partnership. See New York v U.S., supra, 505 at 167 ('where Congress has the 
authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress' 
power to offer States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having 
state law pre-empted by federal regulation'). 
29 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (providing that, except for preemption of certain State regulation of 
nd/. 
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The Canadian federal/province system provides a different balance between the two 
types of jurisdictions. Under the Canadian Constitution, the powers of the Provinces 
are specifically defined and limited to the list provided in the Constitution; residuary 
powers are largely granted to the federal government.30 In Canadian constitutional law, 
the doctrine of paramountcy establishes that where (and only where) there is a conflict 
between valid exercises of provincial and federal laws, the federal law will prevail and 
the provincial law will be inoperative to the extent that it conflicts with the federal law. 31 
While the environment is not a specifically delineated matter for provincial legislation, 
provincial power is primary in environmental policy because of extensive provincial 
control over natural resources and energy generation. Only 11 percent of Canada's 
land is privately owned. The remainder is termed 'crown land', and 54 percent of that 
is controlled by the Provinces.32 Much federal crown land lies in the territories and in 
special use areas within the Provinces. 33 Provinces have direct control over exploration, 
'development, conservation and management of non-renewable natural resources and 
forestry resources', and 'development, conservation and management of sites and facili­
ties in the province for the generation and production of electrical energy'. 34 Further, the 
Provinces control 'all Lands, Mines, Minerals, and Royalties belonging to the several 
Provinces of Canada'. 35 
Here then is one of the chief contrasts between the two nations that is basic to their 
approach to environmental regulation. Where the Canadian Provinces have primary 
control over natural resources, in the United States, the federal government controls 
28 percent of the total land (47% in the West)36 under the Constitution's public lands 
clause.37 However, the States still have important environmental regulatory roles 
because they have traditionally regulated land use under police power. 
US federal land remains the focus of an intense debate over whether public lands 
should be dedicated to 'preservation', traditionally understood to exclude economic 
exploitation, or 'conservation', traditionally understood to allow exploitation so long 
moving sources, 'nothing in this chapter shall preclude or deny the right of any State or any politi­
cal subdivi�ion thereof to adopt or enforce (1) any standard or limitation respecting emissions of 
air pollutants or (2) any requirement respecting control or abatement of air pollution'). 
3° Constitution Act, 1867 30 and 31 Victoria, c. 3 (U.K.) § 91. 
31 See Smith v The Queen [1960] S.C.R. 776. 
32 'Crown Land', Historica Canada, http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/crown-la 
33 Ibid. 
34 Constitution Act, 1867 30 and 31 Victoria, c. 3 (U .K.) § 92A, added by the Constitution Act, 
1982, § 50. 
35 Constitution Act, 1867 30 and 31 Victoria, c. 3 (U.K.) § 107. Manitoba, Alberta and 
Saskatchewan were placed in the same position as the original provinces by the Constitution Act, 
1930, 20-21 Geo. V, c. 26 (U.K.), British Columbia by the British Columbia Terms of Union and 
also in part by the Constitution Act, 1930, and Newfoundland by the Newfoundland Act, 12-13 
Geo. Vl,  c. 22 (U.K.). 
36 Carol Hardy Vincent, 'Federal Land Ownership: Overview and Data', Congressional Research 
Service (2014) https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42346.pdf (accessed December 29, 2016); Quoctrung 
Bui and Margot Sanger-Katz, 'Why the Government Owns So Much Land in the West', NY Times, 
January 6, 2016, at Al  4. 
37 Art. IV,§ 3, Cl. 2. 
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as the fundamental productivity of the land is maintained.38 This debate is closely 
connected to the principles of sustainability and sustainable development discussed 
below. 
VI29.3.2 Public participation 
Both Canadian and US law make many provisions for public participation in gov­
ernmental decision-making. Public participation is a common mandatory element in 
both nations' statutes, with required notification, consultation with stakeholders, and 
extended public comment opportunities a standard part of rule-making and permit­
consideration processes.39 
VI29.3.3 Public information 
Both the US and Canada have long had statutes requiring government agencies to make 
information on their activities publicly available.4° Following the Bhopal disaster, as 
noted above, both governments also enacted community right to know laws requiring 
industries to provide publicly available information on their use, storage, and disposal 
of hazardous chemicals.41 
VL29.3.4 Private enforcement 
A number of each country's environmental statutes also allow private actors, not just 
government officials, to bring actions against perceived violators of public environ­
mental laws. Both nations employ a two-step process, in which there is first a notice to 
the regulator and alleged perpetrator of the details of the offense, and then a right to 
commence an action if the official response is deemed unsatisfactory. The US permits 
such private actions in numerous environmental statutes,42 while Canada grants a broad 
right to commence actions against any party that has 'caused significant harm to the 
environment'.43 In addition to injunctive and other relief, a key incentive for the private 
suit is the award of attorneys' fees and costs to successful litigants.44 
VL29.3.5 Judicial review 
Both countries and their States and Provinces generally provide for judicial review of 
decisions by environmental agencies. Actions for review can be brought by a broad 
range of potential claimants, usually including potential targets as well as beneficiaries 
of regulation. Courts can evaluate administrative actions on procedural, legal, and sub­
stantive grounds, often including reasonability.45 While the environmental implications 
of widespread judicial review are contested, it seems likely to press generally for greater 
38 Robinson (2005) 371 (internal citation omitted). 
39 See e.g. CEPA 1999, Part 2 (Public Participation). 
40 Holsen (2007). 
41 See e.g. EPCRA, TSCA, CEPA 1999. 
42 Among these are the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § I 1046(a), 
and§ 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a). 
43 CEPA 1999, § 22(2)(b). 
44 Boyer and Meidinger (1985). 
45 Mullan (2001); Straus (2016). 
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attention to both legal standards and empirical data as well as a connection between legal 
goals and agency policies. 
VL29.3.6 Non-state governance 
Beyond playing a variety of roles in government environmental regulation, NGOs have 
also created alternative environmental standards and adjudication (often 'certification') 
processes. These have played a significant role in preventing environmental degrada­
tion, promoting environmental justice, and achieving sustainable development goals 
in both countries. The model program is the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), which 
instituted standards coupled with forest certification and wood product labeling systems 
for sustainable forestry in 1993. The FSC had great influence on forestry governance 
and also stimulated the creation of many other environmental certification programs.46 
An important example is the US Green Building Council's Leadership in Energy & 
Environmental Design (LEED) certification program, which has become the de facto 
standard for sustainable commercial and residential construction. Developed by consen­
sus and collaborative effort, the benchmarks within this program have been adopted by 
many local and state governments as minimum standards for their own buildings. Across 
many sectors, the environmental governance landscape is now heavily populated with a 
great variety of programs setting standards, monitoring performance, and adjudicating 
compliance.47 These non-governmental programs interact with each other as well as state 
regulatory programs, creating a new landscape of environmental law that legal academ­
ics are only beginning to grasp.48 
Vl29.3. 7 Market mechanisms 
The monetizing trend described above is mirrored by an ideological taste for market­
based regulation. The US transformed its air pollution regulatory system from one based 
on uniform rules for specific types of emissions sources into one allowing emissions 
trading among contiguous polluters in the late 1970s and early 1980s.49 Thereafter it 
instituted a nationwide cap-and-trade program for sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide 
emissions from power plants.50 Similar trends, including occasional use of charges and 
environmental taxes, are present in both countries.51 Both States and Provinces are 
employing market mechanisms such as cap-and-trade52 and utility deregulation53 to 
drive renewable energy efforts and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
46 Meidinger (2006). 
47 Abbott and Snidal (2009). 
48 Wood, Abbott, Black, Eberlein and Meidinger (2015). 
49 Meidinger (1985). 
50 See Dallas Burtraw and Sarah Jo Szambelan, 'U.S. Emissions Trading Markets for S02 and 
NOx, 2009 Resources for the Future', at http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/Workimages/Download/ 
RFF-DP-09-40. pelf ( accessed December 26, 2016). 
51 Stavins (2003).
52 In fact, two of the provinces have been working with individual States to link their cap-and­
trade programs, see California Environmental Protection Agency Air Resources California web­
site at https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/linkage/linkage.htm (accessed August 30, 2017). 
53 See e.g. New York's Reforming the Energy Vision, Public Service Commission Case No. 
14-M-0101 Order Implementing Proceeding, April 25, 2014. 
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VI.29.4 Substantive principles 
Vl29.4.l Cost-benefit analysis 
Although neither the federal Administrative Procedure Act54 nor most enabling statutes 
specifically require cost-benefit analysis in rule-making, the recent judicial trend, 
headlined by the Supreme Court's rejection of an EPA rule governing mercury pollution 
from power plants instituted without consideration of costs,55 has been to require such 
analysis, and the US can be seen as becoming a cost-benefit State.56 The implications 
and effects of widespread use of cost-benefit analysis are controversial57 and far exceed 
the scope of this chapter. However, it is clear that requiring a cost-benefit justification 
for environmental regulation, particularly if it must be quantified as is usually the goal, 
is a fundamental substantive value that heavily shapes the content of environmental law. 
Vl29.4.2 Responsibility not to cause transboundary environmental harm 
Both nations have long acknowledged their mutual interests flowing from the transna­
tional nature of environmental conditions and have been leaders in addressing transna­
tional environmental problems. In 1909, the US and Canada entered into the Boundary 
Waters Treaty (BWT), an agreement well ahead of its time in specifically addressing 
pollution and other non-navigational issues:58 'waters herein defined as boundary waters 
and waters flowing across the boundary shall not be polluted on either side to the injury of 
health or property on the other'. 59 The countries also formed the bi-national International 
Joint Commission (IJC), which is responsible for implementing not only the BWT but 
also the more recent the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements 'to restore and maintain 
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Waters of the Great Lakes'.60 
The two countries also defined their respective rights and duties through the Trail 
Smelter Arbitration, which arose as a result of pollution from a smelter in British 
Columbia causing harm to farmers in Washington State.61 The arbitration found 
Canada liable under a standard that has subsequently been described as a fundamental 
54 Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237. 
55 Michigan v EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). See e.g. Nat'/ Ass'n of Home Builders v EPA, 682 
F.3d 1032, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (EPA rule upheld in part because cost analysis was performed); 
Corrosion Proof Fittings v EPA, 947 F.2d 1201(5th Cir. 1991) (EPA ban on asbestos products 
voided, inter alia, because EPA failed to assess costs and benefits of the least to most burdensome 
alternatives, and Agency's calculations of benefits and costs were inaccurate and failed to factor 
the costs and risks of substitute products); Center for Biological Diversity v NHTSA, 538 F.3d 
1172 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (NHTSA's failure to include in its analysis the benefit of carbon emissions 
reduction in either quantitative or qualitative form was arbitrary and capricious). 
56 See Sunstein (2016); Revesz (2016). 
57 See e.g. Ackerman and Heinzerling (2002). 
58 Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters, and 
Questions Arising Between the United States and Canada (BWT), January 11, 1909, U.S.-U.K., 
36 Stat. 2448, T.I.A.S. No. 548. See Graffy (1998) (stating that the Boundary Waters Treaty is one 
of the earliest 'non-navigational international watercourse treaties'). 
59 BWT, 36 Stat. at 2450. 
60 The text of the 1972 Agreement an each subsequent amendment is available at http://www. 
ijc.org/en_!Great_Lakes_Quality (accessed December 27, 2016). 
61 Bratspies and Miller (2006) 3. 
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principle of customary international law: 'no State has the right to use or permit the use 
of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury ... in or to the territory of another 
or of the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the 
injury is established by clear and convincing evidence'.62 But although the Washington 
farmers received some measure of payment, and the smelter did agree to reduce emis­
sions, the reality was that the case resolution allowed companies on both sides of the 
border virtually unfettered latitude for continued cross-border pollution with minimal 
consequences.63 Decades later, when the same smelter was brought to task for admit­
tedly dumping hazardous materials into the Columbia River for almost a hundred 
years, Canada strongly objected to American enforcement efforts in applying CERCLA 
extraterritorially- a problem the courts finessed by finding that since the slag had moved 
downstream into the US, CERCLA was not being applied to activities on foreign soil.64 
Thus, although transboundary responsibility is incorporated in both countries' law, 
political and economic forces tend to limit its effects. 
VL29.4.3 Sustainable development 
Both the US and Canada are signatories to the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development, 65 which affirmed the central importance of sustainable development. 66 
While the meaning of sustainable development is subject to much debate, the core idea 
is that economic development, environmental protection, and social progress must be 
pursued simultaneously and in a mutually supporting fashion, instead of, for example, 
pursuing economic development at the expense of environmental sustainability or social 
justice.67 At the level of the national governments, only Canada has officially embraced 
sustainable development as a mandate. In the United States action has largely come 
through Executive Orders in the Clinton and Obama Administrations.68 
The greatest American supporters of sustainable development have been States and 
localities. Numerous States have adopted Renewable Portfolio Standards requiring ever 
greater shares of electric generation to be provided by renewable sources. States have 
adopted energy-efficient building codes based on the International Energy Conservation 
Code,69 and numerous communities and States have adopted LEED standards for their 
62 Trail Smelter (US. v Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1938, 1965 (March 11, 1941). 
63 See Wirth (2000). 
64 Pakootas v Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). 
65 United Nations Environment Programme, Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, at http://www.unep.org/docum.ents.multilingua1/default.asp?documentid=78&arti 
cleid= l 163 (accessed December 4, 2016). 
66 Statement of President George Bush at the Rio Conference, June 13, 1992, at http://www. 
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=21079#axzz2gnlnPngp (accessed December 4, 2016). 
67 E.g. Giddings, Hopwood and O'Brien (2002). 
68 See US EO 12852 (establishing a President's Council on Sustainable Development to advise 
the President on the topic) and EO 13693 (directing executive offices and agencies to take a host 
of actions to pursue sustainability, particularly with regard to reducing greenhouse gas emissions) 
80 F .R. 15871. Executive orders are official directives issued by the President to executive agencies 
specifying how they are to exercise their discretionary powers. 
69 International Code Council, http://codes.iccsafe.org/app/book/toc/2015/I-Codes/2015%20 
IECC%20HTML/index.html (accessed December 18, 2016). 
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own buildings, along with efforts to incorporate sustainable development goals into their 
infrastructure planning processes.70 
The Canadian Federal Sustainable Development Act (FSDS)71 adopts the standard 
definition of sustainable development from the Brundtland report, 72 defining sustainable 
development as 'development that meets the needs of the present without compromis­
ing the ability of future generations to meet their own needs' .73 The FSDS is more 
aspirational than specific, setting out a path for the adoption of policies by the Minister 
of the Environment and each ministry. Most importantly, the FSDS chooses a specific 
policy, demanding that the Federal Sustainable Development Strategy shall be 'based on 
the precautionary principle'. 74 Since its passage, the Strategy has gone through several 
iterations, the strongest of which was recently tabled in Parliament in October 2016, and 
supports the aforementioned provincial-federal carbon pricing deal and phase out of 
coal-powered generation.75 
VL29.4.4 Sustainable use of natural resources 
The concept of sustainable use of resources is well established in both countries' laws, 
and particularly manifests itself in the mandate for long-term resource management 
plans. For example, the US Federal Land Policy and Management Act76 and the 
National Forest Management Act77 require the Bureau of Land Management and 
the United States Forest Service respectively to identify, inventory, and sustainably 
manage resources on federal public lands and national forests. The US Magnuson­
Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 78 establishes Regional Fishery 
Management Councils charged with developing and recommending fishery management 
plans, both to restore depleted stocks and manage healthy stocks.79 There is much 
debate, however, whether sustainable use is being achieved in any of these areas. The 
agencies charged with doing so are regularly buffeted by powerful political forces, forc­
ing changes in particular sustainability plans.80 
70 See e.g. New York State Smart Growth Public Infrastructure Policy Act, Envtl. Conserv. L 
§§ 6-0101 through 6-011. 
71 See generally TSCA (chemical registration) and RCRA (cradle to grave hazardous waste 
reporting).
72 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (The 
Brundtland Report) (1980 OUP). 
73 Federal Sustainable Development Act, § 2. 
74 Ibid at§ 9(1). 
75 Environment and Climate Change Canada, Federal Sustainable Development Strategy, 
https://www.ec.gc.ca/dd-sd/defau1t.asp?Lang=En&n=CD30F295-1 (accessed December 9, 2016). 
76 P.L. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743. 
77 P.L. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949. 
78 P.L. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331. 
79 NOAA Fisheries, Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Conservation & Management Act, at http:// 
www.westcoast.fisheries.noaa.gov/whatwedo/msa/magnuson_stevens_act.html (accessed November 
16, 2016), 
8
° Culhane (2011). 
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VL29.4.5 Sustainable production and consumption (life-cycle analysis) 
Corollaries to sustainable development, sustainable procurement and similar poli­
cies have found support through the Canadian Policy on Green Procurement, which 
includes environmental performance considerations, including life-cycle costing in its 
procurement decisions.81 This is part of a significant effort led by the Office of Greening 
Government Operations (OGGO) within the Public Works and Government Services 
Canada, aimed at shrinking the Government's environmental footprint through various 
efforts, including reducing the environmental impacts of assets through their life cycle.82 
Although Congress has been less supportive of sustainable development -efforts, 
life-cycle costing has long been a staple of federal procurement efforts. For building­
design energy-conservation measures, the process is part of the federal procurement 
regulations.83 Federal agencies routinely incorporate life-cycle analysis.84 
Many cities have aggressively pursued sustainable procurement combining social, 
environmental, and fiscal objectives in green procurement efforts. In North Carolina, 
the city of Raleigh's Sustainable Procurement Policy includes not only environmental 
life-cycle cost considerations such as greenhouse gas emissions and energy efficiency and 
consumption, but also 'social equity factors' such as human health impacts, environmen­
tal justice, and fair labor practices. 85 
VL29.4.6 Pollution prevention 
Prevention of future pollution is probably the most common theme in environmental 
law. In one of the rare US laws laying out broad environmental goals, the Pollution 
Prevention Act of 1990 
declares it to be the national policy of the United States that pollution should be prevented or 
reduced at the source whenever feasible; pollution that cannot be prevented should be recycled 
in an environmentally safe manner, whenever feasible; pollution that cannot be prevented or 
recycled should be treated in an environmentally safe manner whenever feasible; and disposal 
or other release into the environment should be employed only as a last resort and should be 
conducted in an environmentally safe manner.86 
Similarly,_ the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999 (CEPA 1999)87 tasks the 
federal government with taking 'preventive and remedial measures to protect, enhance 
and restore the environment' .88 
This principle is central throughout US and Canadian law through permitting 
81 Policy on Green Procurement at http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/ecologisation-greening/achats­
procurement/politique-policy-eng.html (accessed December 26, 2016). 
82 OGGO website at http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/ecologisation-greening/index-eng.html 
(accessed December 24, 2016). 
s3 IO C.F.R. Part 436, Subpart A. 
84 E.g. Department of Defense AcqNotes website, at http://www.acqnotes.com/acqnote/tasks/ 
life-cycle-cost-estimatecost-estimate (accessed December 24, 2016). 
85 City of Raleigh Sustainable Procurement Policy, at https://www.raleighnc.gov/content/ 
AdminServSustain/Documents/CoRSustainableProcurement. pdf (accessed December 6, 2016). 
86 Pollution Prevention Act of 1990, P.L. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388-321. 
87 s.c. 1999, c. 33. 
88 CEPA, 1999, §2( l )(a.1). 
92 
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programs and comprehensive hazardous waste management and disposal regulations.89 
For example, the US Clean Air Act has as its major goals to (1) prevent significant 
deterioration of air quality in attainment areas (areas meeting air quality standards)90 
and (2) prohibit further deterioration in non-attainment areas without gaining offsetting 
emissions reductions, providing a 'positive new air quality benefit' in the same area as the 
proposed facility and for the same pollutant.91 Nonetheless, as noted above, the preven­
tion principle often gives way to exceptions driven by power politics. 
VL29.4. 7 Precaution 
The precautionary principle seeks to respond to our often quite limited knowledge 
of the effects of human activity by erring on the side of caution. But what this 
should mean in practice is greatly contested.92 Some degree of precaution is present 
in virtually all US and Canadian environmental legislation. The US Clean Air Act, 
for example, directs the EPA Administrator to 'prescribe standards applicable to the 
emission of any air pollutant from any class ... of new motor vehicles ... which in his 
judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated 
to endanger public health or welfare'.93 Thus, conclusive evidence of endangerment 
is not required. However, what meets the standard of 'reasonable endangerment' 
remains vigorously contested nearly a half century after enactment. No clear guidance 
can be offered about how much precaution is enough or how much is too much. At 
best, precaution can be understood as a matter involving considerable administrative 
discretion - one that can be answered by different administrations differently and 
is generally reviewed by courts under a reasonability standard.94 One approach to 
giving the principle structure is by analyzing it under the traditional 'Learned Hand' 
framework: 
The precautionary principle calls for risk assessment decisions that weigh and balance the 
probability and severity of the harm to be regulated. The ... decision maker may act on a 
higher probability of a lesser harm or a lower probability of a greater harm ... The important 
effect of so weighing probability and severity is to reduce the level of probability of harm to less 
than the traditional evidentiary standard in civil cases ... that the facts relied upon be more 
likely than not to be true. Coupled with the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard for review of 
informal rulemaking, the precautionary principle reinforces the conclusion that the decision 
maker need not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that harm is occurring or would 
occur in the future to take action - only that the possible harm is serious or probability of harm 
is 'significant'.95 
89 For example, when T S CA was adopted regulating toxic substances, the head of the EPA 
called it "'one of the most important pieces of 'preventive medicine' legislation" ever passed 
by Congress'. Press Release , U.S. EPA, Train Sees New Toxic Substances Law as 'Preventive 
Medicine' (October 21, 1976) , cited in Markel (2010) at 336-337. 
90 42 u.s.c. § 7475. 
9! 42 u.s.c. § 7503. 
E.g., Raffensperger and Tickner (1999); Sunstein (2005); Vogel (2012); Wiener et al. (2011); 
Morag-Levine (2014). 
93 U.S.C. 752l(a)( l ). 
94 E.g., Ethyl Corp v EPA [1976] 541 F2d 1. 





418 Encyclopedia of environmental law: volume VI 
Still, this formulation gives no concrete guidance on the definitions of serious harm or 
significant probability. These are worked out differently in different arenas and eras of 
environmental regulation. Moreover, the principle of cost-benefit analysis discussed 
above often works its way into the precautionary calculus. For example, in deciding 
whether one State's air emissions 'contribute significantly' to another State's non­
attainment of health-based ambient air quality standards the EPA is allowed to consider 
the potential costs of controlling such emissions. 96 While this is consistent with the 'cost­
effective' language in the Rio Declaration, it palpably limits the reach of precaution, 
since control costs are often easier to estimate than long-term health risks. 
The precautionary principle is sometimes applied to shift the burden of proof to activi­
ties creating potential risks. California's proposition 65, for example, requires a warning 
for listed chemicals known to cause cancer or birth defects, with exemptions 'allowed 
only if the business responsible for exposure ... can demonstrate that the amount of 
chemical in question poses "no significant risk'".97 Similarly, when commencement of 
high-volume, hydraulic fracturing ('fracking') was proposed in New York, the State 
Department of Health conducted a scientific review and concluded that 'information 
gaps still exist', 'existing science ... is very sparse', and the 'studies that have been 
published have significant scientific limitations'.98 This declared shortage of information 
was used to justify the State's decision to ban the practice. 
In Canada, as noted above, the precautionary principle is incorporated into the FSDS, 
as well as the CEPA, Canada's primary federal environmental statute, 'govern[ing] activi­
ties within the federal jurisdiction such as cross-border air pollution, the dumping of sub­
stances into oceans and navigable waterways and the regulation of toxic substances'.99 
CEPA takes a more direct approach than its US counterparts by 'requir[ing] the govern­
ment to apply the precautionary principle such that " ... where there are threats of seri­
ous or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason 
for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation'". 100 The 
Supreme Court of Canada, recognizing its international acceptance, has adopted use of 
the precautionary principle when interpreting Canadian environmental law. 101 
VL29.4.8· Integration: environmental impact assessment 
The integration principle - the idea that the environmental consequences of actions 
should always be considered in deciding whether to take them - has long been estab­
lished in US and Canadian law. In the US, beginning with the National Environmental 
96 Michigan v EPA [2000] 213 F3d 663. 
97 Pease (1992). 
98 A Public Health Review of High Volume Hydraulic Fracturing for Shale Gas Development 
(December 2014), p. 85, available at https://www.health.ny.gov/press/reports/docs/high_volume_ 
hydraulicJracturing,pdf (accessed December 14, 2016). 
99 Cotton and Zimmer (1992). 
100 The ENGO Agenda for the Review of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act 
( 1999), available at http://www.cela.ca/sites/cela.ca/files/uploads/504_CEPA....Review.pdf (accessed 
December 16, 2016). 
101 Benevides and McClenaghan (2002) (citing 114957 Canada Ltee ( Spraytech, Societe 
d'arrosage) and Services des espaces verts Ltee/Chemlawn v Town of Hudson, 2001 SCC 40 at paras 
31 and 32). 
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Policy Act of 1970 (NEPA), 102 federal agencies are required to evaluate and consider the 
environmental consequences of their actions before making decisions and committing 
agency resources and funds for a particular purpose. NEPA's primary role is to provide 
a series of procedures to facilitate the review of environmental impacts and to inject 
environmental considerations into the consciousness of agency decision-makers. In 
general, where an agency proposes to fund, undertake, or approve an action, the agency 
must conduct an environmental assessment to determine whether the action could have 
significant environmental impacts. If so, an environmental impact statement (EIS) is 
required. An EIS is a detailed statement on the environmental impacts of the proposed 
action, any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided, alternatives to 
the action, the relationship between short-term uses and long-term productivity, and 
irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the 
proposed action should it be implemented.103 NEPA has been significant in that, prior to 
its adoption, federal agencies had little incentive to consider the environmental impacts 
of their actions, primarily because their activities were 'mission-oriented'.104 Despite 
NEPA's success in bringing environmental considerations into the agency. decision­
making process, one of its significant limitations is lack of a substantive mandate to 
minimize environmental damage. 105 
Following NEPA's enactment, various State governments in the US adopted similar 
statutes applying to state and local agency action. 106 In some cases, these 'little NEPAs' 
have gone further by injecting substantive requirements into agency decision-making. 
For example, the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) requires agencies to 
'develop standards and procedures necessary to protect environmental quality' and 'to 
implement feasible alternatives to projects that would significantly impact the environ­
ment, or feasible mitigation measures to lessen the impact of projects' . 107 Similarly, New 
York's State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) requires agencies to 'make 
an explicit finding that the requirements [of SEQRA] have been met and that consist­
ent with social, economic and other essential considerations, to the maximum extent 
practicable, adverse environmental effects revealed ... will be minimized or avoided' . 108 
Canada has a similar framework of federal and provincial statutes requiring the 
review of environmental impacts prior to agency decision-making. Following the US's 
adoption of NEPA, 'the Canadian federal cabinet made a commitment to environmental 
assessment of federal decisions ... [which] was formalized in 1984 as the Environmental 
Assessment and Review Process Guidelines Order' .109 Environmental assessment was 
102 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. 
103 Dep't ofTransp. v Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 756-757 (2004); 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). 
104 NEPA Law and Litig. § 1:2 (2016). 
105 Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980) ('Once an 
agency has made a decision subject to NEPA's procedural requirements, the only role for a court is 
to insure that the agency has considered the environmental consequences; it cannot interject itself 
within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action to be taken' (internal 
quotations and citations omitted)). 
106 NEPA Law and Litig. § 12:1 (2016). 
107 O'Brien (2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
108 N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law§ 8-0109(8). 
109 Powell (2014) 9. 
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determined to apply 'whenever the federal government had an affirmative regula­
tory duty related to a proposed initiative, undertaking or activity'.110 Thereafter, the 
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA) was adopted, and, as modified in 
2012, 'shift[ed] most environmental assessment responsibility to the provinces', 'O]imit­
ing the scope of federal assessments to matters of exclusive federal jurisdiction .. . ' . 111 
Thus, the provincial role of environmental impact review has become more prominent 
and, '[w]hile all Canadian provinces and territories have environmental assessment 
processes and requirements, these vary greatly creating a patchwork of environmental 
assessment regimes throughout Canada' . 112 
VL29.4.9 Polluter pays 
The polluter pays principle (PPP) holds that polluters should be responsible for the 
costs their pollution imposes on others. ll3 This can be achieved through regulatory 
burdens designed to minimize or prevent harmful pollution, a liability scheme requiring 
compensation for pollution, or targeted taxation imposed on polluters. In the US, the 
PPP is manifest only in limited ways, and even then its impact is questionable. For 
example, tort claims (e.g., nuisance, trespass, negligence) generally impose liability upon 
those responsible for pollution, but are only effective when the costs of gaining redress 
do not exceed the benefits and when causation of actual harm can be shown.114 The 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA),115 adopted to address the problem of contaminated sites, affixes liability 
to 'responsible' parties and creates a legal framework for which clean-up costs may be 
recovered. However, responsible parties often cannot be found and PPP is only 'one of 
many factors that may or may not bear on a given equitable allocation determination' 
of pollution costs.116 Canada's provincial regulation of hazardous waste sites follows 
a similar approach, with the PPP part of the equation, but not the dominating consid­
eration.117 Finally, as noted in the 'precaution' section, pollution control typically is 
required only when and to the degree it appears economically feasible. Consequently, in 
a great many circumstances polluters do not bear the full costs of their pollution. 
VL29.4.10 Strict liability 
Both the US and Canada allow the imposition of strict liability (liability without a 
showing of negligence or fault) in tort. However, such liability is generally limited to 
abnormally dangerous or hazardous activities, 118 which are usually not held to encom­
pass common polluting activities. The doctrine also appears in CERCLA, which imposes 
110 Ibid. 
lll Robert B Gibson, 'In Full Retreat: The Canadian Government's New Environmental 
Assessment Law Undoes Decades of Progress' (2012) Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 
179, 184-185. 
112 Powell (2015) 6. 
113 Mamlyuk (2009). 
114 See Gergen (1994). 
115 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. 
116 Beazer East, Inc. v Mead Corp., 412 F.3d 429 (3d Cir. 2005). 
117 Sommers (2008). 
118 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. and Emot. Harm§ 20 (2010). 
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strict liability for remediation costs, 119 and in the Oil Pollution Act, which makes each 
responsible party for oil pollution liable for removal costs and damages. 120 
An important cognate of strict liability also operates in the civil penalty clauses of 
many environmental statutes, which provide that penalties for violations of pollution 
standards or permit requirements can be imposed without any showing of fault on the 
part of the polluter. 121 While this is not liability for the damage per se, it can be seen as 
a form of strict liability because the prosecutor need not show fault, thus significantly 
enhancing the likelihood of a penalty. 
VL29.4.11 Extended producer responsibility 
Extended producer responsibility requires producers of hazardous products or waste 
to provide for their eventual disposal or remediation. In the US this principle is 
most clearly embodied by the RCRA, which takes a 'cradle-to-grave' approach by 
regulating the generation, transportation, treatment, storage, and eventual disposal 
of hazardous waste.122 Generators remain liable throughout the process for any 
improper handling that results in site contamination. Another example has been 
trending at the State level, with laws regulating certain types of products and placing 
the burden of disposal on the products' manufacturers. In New York, for example, 
the State legislature adopted the Rechargeable Battery Law123 designed to reduce the 
toxic material in solid waste streams by removing rechargeable batteries. The Battery 
Law requires manufacturers of rechargeable batteries to take back and recycle used 
batteries that are sold and disposed of in New York. It also imposes obligations on 
both manufacturers and retailers of such batteries, requiring used battery collection 
from the end consumers. 
In 2009, the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment issued a 'Canada-wide 
Action Plan for Extended Producer Responsibility', which 'would seek the adoption by 
producers of full life-cycle cost accounting from their products ... [and] see the costs of 
the end-of-life management of products treated similarly to other factors of production 
and incorporated into wholesale and retail product prices'. 124 The goal of this effort is 
to shift the cost burden from the taxpayers to the producers and consumers of certain 
products. 
VI.29.5 Conclusion 
Environmental principles are present in many areas of US law and help organize under­
standing of those areas. However, none has become pervasively foundational, nor played 
a determinative role in guiding the development of that body of law. Instead, US envi­
ronmental law continues to develop relatively piecemeal and to be shaped primarily by 
119 Klass (2004). 
120 Murchison (2011). 
121 E.g., Boyer and Meidinger (1985). 
122 Meghrig v KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479,483 (1996). 
123 Article 27, Title 18 of the New York Environmental Conservation Law. 
124 Canada-wide Action Plan for Extended Producer Responsibility, Canadian Council of 
Ministers of the Environment (2009), p. ii, available at: http://www.ccme.ca/files/current_priori 
ties/waste/pn_ 1499 _epr_ca p_e. pdf ( accessed December 18, 2016). 
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political pragmatism and economic power, pushed along by occasional environmental 
crises. Canada has enshrined sustainable development and the precautionary principle in 
its primary environmental statutes, but evidence of political pragmatism coexisting with 
environmental principles is present there as well. Overall, then, environmental principles 
make a limited contribution to the laudable goals of increasing the intelligibility, predict­
ability, legitimacy, transboundary consistency, and long-term progress of environmental 
law in the US and Canada. 
Conversely, environmental principles may play a larger role in the development 
and elaboration of non-state governance arrangements, as described in the section on 
'non-state governance'. Moreover, it may be that environmental principles are playing 
a growing role at the local government level, as suggested by the section on 'sustainable 
development'. Accordingly, it is possible that, while principles continue to play a limited 
role in federal and state/provincial environmental law, they are taking hold at the local 
and non-governmental levels. If so, as US and Canadian environmental governance 
become increasingly multi-centric and transnational, environmental principles may 
over time play a larger role in shaping those arenas. Accordingly, an important ques­
tion for future research will be the role played by environmental principles through 
local governmental and non-governmental participation in environmental governance 
interactions. 125 
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